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Models of Opinion Dynamics and Mill-Style 
Arguments for Opinion Diversity 
Bert Baumgaertner ∗ 
Abstract: »Agentenbasierte Modelle der Meinungsdynamik und das Mill’sche 
Argument für Meinungsvielfalt«. John Stuart Mill advocated for increased in-
teractions between individuals of dissenting opinions for the reason that it 
would improve society. Whether Mill and similar arguments that advocate for 
opinion diversity are valid depends on background assumptions about the psy-
chology and sociality of individuals. The field of opinion dynamics is a burgeon-
ing testing ground for how different combinations of sociological and psycho-
logical facts contribute to phenomena that affect opinion diversity, such as 
polarization. This paper applies some recent results from the opinion dynamics 
literature to assess the impacts of the Millian suggestion. The goal is to under-
stand how the scope of the validity of Mill-style arguments depends on plausi-
ble assumptions that can be formalized using agent-based models, a common 
modeling approach in opinion dynamics. The most salient insight is that ho-
mophily (increased interactions between like-minded individuals) does not suf-
ficiently explain decreased opinion diversity. Hence, decreasing homophily by 
increasing interactions between individuals of dissenting opinions is not the 
simple solution that a Millian-style argument may advocate. 
Keywords: John Stuart Mill, opinion dynamics, opinion diversity, homophily, 
polarization. 
1.  Introduction  
I’m going to show how models of opinion dynamics allow us to better under-
stand John Stuart Mill’s arguments concerning diversity of opinion. In particu-
lar, I will demonstrate how Mill-style arguments about the benefits of opinion 
diversity depend on relevant assumptions about the psychology and sociality of 
individuals, thereby restricting the scope of validity of said arguments. Just as 
logic can be used to formally investigate and rigorously analyze arguments, so 
simulations can be used to explicitly codify assumptions underlying arguments, 
in this case the benefits of opinion diversity.  
                                                             
∗  Bert Baumgaertner, Department of Politics and Philosophy, University of Idaho, 875 Perime-
ter Drive, MS 3165 Moscow, USA; bbaum@uidaho.edu.  
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The growing field of opinion dynamics studies how opinions change over 
time as a function of psychological and sociological assumptions. Researchers 
in opinion dynamics have been primarily interested in how consensus or polar-
ization at the population level emerge from interactions at the individual level, 
but their insights also apply to diversity of opinion. For example, the mainte-
nance or generation of diversity of opinion can be seen as the failure of reach-
ing consensus or polarization: in many cases modelers start with a population 
of randomly distributed opinions (which is presumed to capture a certain sense 
of what is meant by diversity – discussed later) and then see how that distribu-
tion changes as interactions take place in the model.  
The field of opinion dynamics is not directly an outgrowth of Mill’s work, 
nor is it housed as a specialization within philosophy. It is nevertheless rele-
vant. If it can be said that there is a specialization in philosophy called ‘formal 
social epistemology,’ then opinion dynamics would most closely resemble it. I 
say ‘close’ because there is one key difference. Social epistemology (not just 
the formal investigations) keeps a close eye on how social practices affect the 
spread of true beliefs, while opinion dynamics models tend to abstract truth 
from its analyses. There are alternative approaches in social epistemology 
called ‘social doxology’ that also do not make truth a primary focus of their 
analyses, and comparisons between veritistic social epistemology and social 
doxology have been made.1 However, I am not concerned in this paper with the 
relationships between these areas. My goal is to draw attention to some of the 
insights that the opinion dynamics literature provides and show how they bear 
on philosophical thinking of opinion diversity.  
Another closely related area includes a body of work in philosophy of sci-
ence on the cognitive division of labor (see for example Kitcher 1990; Hegsel-
mann and Krause 2006; Weisberg and Muldoon 2009; Zollman 2010; and the 
paper by Borg et al. 2018, in this HSR Special Issue). This body of work re-
flects a growing interest in the social aspects of belief acquisition. However, 
the emphasis in the research on the division of cognitive labor is different than 
in opinion dynamics. The former models represent investigations of scientists 
and their research programs, whereas the opinion dynamics literature tends to 
represent populations at large. Thus, the decisions for how to model the cogni-
tive aspects of individuals differ substantially. For example, although both 
areas take bounded rationality seriously, philosophers of science are less inter-
ested in studying the effects of cognitive biases or explaining phenomena such 
as polarization.2  
                                                             
1  See the first part of Goldman (1999), where social doxology is criticized as an alternative to 
veritistic social epistemology.  
2  There are of course exceptions. For example, it can be shown that polarization emerges even 
when agents are boundedly rational. See, for example, ongoing work by members of the 
Computational Social Philosophy Lab at the University of Pennsylvania. 
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The results from the opinion dynamics literature also have political rele-
vance. Polarization, for example, comes in many flavors, including increased 
partisan voting patterns, the adoption of more extreme policies, the rise of 
overtly partisan television networks, or more generally the divergence of politi-
cal attitudes. It has been argued that political polarization is caused by homoph-
ily, i.e., increased interaction between like-minded individuals (Gilbert, Berg-
strom and Karahalios 2009; Baron et al. 1996; Sunstein 2002). Arguments of 
this sort appeal to empirical studies to support their claims. However, some 
findings from the opinion dynamics literature demonstrate that homophily does 
not produce polarization unless we make additional assumptions about how 
individuals update their opinions (Dandekar, Goel and Lee 2013). In other 
words, it is possible to have populations with homophily that fail to be polar-
ized, and hence an appeal to homophily is not a sufficient explanation for po-
larization. This point will be discussed in more depth later.  
Most of the models discussed in this paper are known as agent-based models 
(ABMs).3 The main idea is that these models explicitly represent individuals of 
a population and their interactions with one another. There is sometimes a 
temptation to think of agent-based models as ‘more realistic’ than their equa-
tion-based counterparts. (Equation-based models represent aggregates of indi-
viduals and how those aggregates change through time or space.) No assump-
tion that ABMs are more realistic will be made here. The insights that we glean 
from agent-based models of opinion dynamics should not be thought of as 
providing additional realism to the ideas that are being tested. Rather, the ap-
plication of agent-based modeling in this context makes salient assumptions 
that Mill and others hadn’t considered and shows that these assumptions are 
relevant to the arguments that are forwarded. These assumptions need not bear 
on reality directly, but they can guide modeling choices by affecting the behav-
ior of models. Section 5 discusses in more detail how ABMs expose important 
assumptions without presupposing that they do so by better representing reali-
ty.  
A brief note on terminology. I will use ‘belief’ and ‘opinion’ interchange- 
ably. Contemporary philosophy tends to favor the term ‘belief.’ John Stuart 
Mill in his work On Liberty, from which I will draw, used the term ‘opinion.’ 
The modeling literature that I will draw from also tends to use the term ‘opin-
ion.’ There is no substantial difference in how these terms are applied in these 
different areas.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 I provide a sum-
mary of the main concepts that will be relevant to subsequent sections of the 
                                                             
3  Readers may also have heard of individual-based models (IBMs). The difference between 
them does not concern us here. Besides, the difference seems to be a historical contingency 
of how the same methodology has been named: ‘IBM’ is the preferred term in areas like 
ecology, whereas ‘ABM’ is more common in areas like economics and other social sciences. 
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paper. In particular, I provide the background for understanding the role that 
homophily plays in explaining polarization – contrary to many explanations, 
homophily is not sufficient for producing polarization. In Section 3 I use results 
from the opinion dynamics literature to argue the point that phenomena such as 
polarization are generated by the right combinations of psychological and so-
cial factors. Then in Section 4 I show how these considerations bear on Millian 
arguments for diversity of opinion. Specifically, I argue that we should view 
opinion diversity as a kind of process, not as a kind of distribution of opinions. 
The reason for this, in brief, is that in conditions where the truth (or ‘ideal 
opinion’) is obvious, we expect consensus of opinion rather than diversity. But 
when the truth (or ‘ideal opinion’) requires some type of searching, then the 
strategies of individuals and the processes that govern opinion updating ought 
to yield diversity of opinion. These philosophical reflections in turn encourage 
the development and investigation of opinion dynamics models that incorporate 
the role of truth. Finally, in Section 5 I take up the topic concerning realism and 
the agent-based models discussed in this paper. 
2. Background 
2.1  Millian Arguments 
John Stuart Mill advocated that dissenting opinions should not be silenced. By 
interacting with someone that disagrees with us, one of two things will happen. 
Either our interlocutor will show that our opinion is mistaken, in which case we 
trade a false opinion for a true one, or, in order to convince our interlocutor that 
they are mistaken, we will have to provide reasons for our opinion, and thereby 
better understand why our opinion is true. In either case, Mill argues, we stand 
to benefit from seeking out dissenting opinions. This argument can be found in 
On Liberty:  
But the peculiar evil of silencing the expression of an opinion is, that it is rob-
bing the human race; posterity as well as the existing generation; those who 
dissent from the opinion, still more than those who hold it. If the opinion is 
right, they are deprived of the opportunity of exchanging error for truth: if 
wrong, they lose, what is almost as great a benefit, the clearer perception and 
livelier impression of truth, produced by its collision with error. (Mill, Chapter 
2 “Of the Liberty of Thought and Discussion,” On Liberty) 
Expressed succinctly, one reason that dissenting opinions should not be si-
lenced is that they deprive individuals from either correcting false beliefs (if the 
dissenting opinion turns out to be true) or better understanding why their be-
liefs are true.  
Two points concerning this argument are relevant here. First, the primary 
motivation for not silencing the expression of dissenting opinions is centered 
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around a concern for the formation of true beliefs. Second, the argument does 
not explicitly advocate that individuals actively seek out or disseminate dissent-
ing opinions, but rather that dissenting opinions deserve at least a passive exist-
ence. These points, however, are not essential to Mill’s thinking about the 
importance of dissenting opinions. Mill provides a similar argument elsewhere 
that does not depend on a concern for truth and expresses an active promotion 
of interactions between dissimilar persons. In Principles of Political Economy 
with some of their Applications to Social Philosophy, Mill says:  
But the economical advantages of commerce are surpassed in importance by 
those of its effects which are intellectual and moral. It is hardly possible to 
overrate the value, in the present low state of human improvement, of placing 
human beings in contact with persons dissimilar to themselves, and with 
modes of thought and action unlike those with which they are familiar. Com-
merce is now what war once was, the principal source of this contact. (Mill, 
1848, Book III, Chapter XVII, Paragraph 1, emphasis mine)  
In this argument, Mill makes room for opinions that may not be straight-
forwardly true or false, but rather express values, morals, or ideals. The exist-
ence of dissenting opinions, then, can have pragmatic advantages (e.g. econom-
ic) or otherwise. Furthermore, this argument fosters a more proactive approach 
in that it instructs or encourages us to have interactions with persons that are 
dissimilar to ourselves; it advocates that we actively seek out dissenting opin-
ions, not just allow for their passive existence.  
Across these arguments, the central idea in Mill’s thinking is that increasing 
interactions between individuals with dissenting opinions is somehow advanta-
geous. Mill provides us with some reasons for thinking this, and other Mill-
style arguments can be formulated in the same spirit that tout the advantages of 
opinion diversity. These arguments, however, rely on some mental model of 
how interactions between individuals (dissenting or otherwise) spread opinions 
through a population. Not all mental models, even plausible ones, will produce 
favorable assessments of Mill-style arguments. For example, if interactions 
between dissenting opinions results with sufficient frequency in the backfire 
effect, where individuals actually strengthen their initial opinion as a result of 
the interaction rather than be more disposed to changing it, then opinions 
across the population will change less over time (or even polarize) and thereby 
stall whatever advantage the relevant opinions are supposed to bring.4 So as-
sessment of Mill-style arguments depends on knowing more of the details of 
the intended model (and whether those details hold true for real populations).  
In order to make salient the relevance of some details, we can start by out-
lining some features of a model explicitly. Let m be some kind of metric by 
which populations can improve or diminish with respect to, be that an increase 
                                                             
4  The first discussion of the backfire effect (by that name) appears in a political context in the 
work of Nyhan and Reifler (2010). 
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in wealth, the frequency of true beliefs, or otherwise. Let r be a source that 
shapes people’s opinions independent of social influence. For example, r might 
be a reason that individuals generate for themselves, contemplate, and then 
change their opinion in response to. We can think of r like a resource by which 
opinions are changed in such a way that m is increased. According to Mill-style 
arguments, some patterns of interactions will be better at distributing r through 
the population than other types of interactions. Specifically, populations where 
interactions occur primarily between like-minded individuals will be less adept 
at distributing r than populations with increased interactions between individu-
als of dissenting opinions. This could be because the interaction between dis-
senting opinions is a way of generating r (“the clearer perception and livelier 
impression of truth, produced by its collision with error”), or because such 
interaction is a way of extending or spreading r to individuals that did not pre-
viously share the opinion that helps increase m (“the opportunity of exchanging 
error for truth”).  
A sketch of this model should allow for opinions to change even in the ab-
sence of r. That is, while r may be one source of opinion change, there are 
other processes by which opinions will spread, such as social influence. For 
example, absent r, the changing of opinions may drift with respect to m, some-
times increasing it and sometimes decreasing it. Other processes of opinion 
change, however, may cause rampant polarization, preventing increases in m 
even with the introduction of r. Mill-style suggestions can be understood as an 
attempt to describe how these processes of opinion change, which can be inves-
tigated separately from r, come to affect the impacts of r when r is present. 
That is, we can ask how processes of opinion change can be conducive in get-
ting r to increase m by spreading r through the population. For example, if 
polarization is contrasted with opinion diversity, then we can understand Milli-
an suggestions as saying that the processes by which opinions change that 
make a population more adept to the spread of r are also processes that tend to 
avoid polarization and have more, e.g., “drift-like” characteristics. This is 
where the relevance of opinion dynamics lies: in specifying more explicitly 
these processes of interest in order to better understand their contributions to 
the spread of opinions.  
In turn, we obtain a better understanding of how to assess Mill-style argu-
ments by specifying under what conditions interactions between dissenting 
opinions is sufficient for avoiding polarization and increasing opinion diversity. 
Although not stated explicitly, the underlying assumption seems to be that a 
lack of opinion diversity is caused by not having sufficient number of interac-
tions between non-like-minded individuals. As explained in more detail below, 
homophily occurs when there are far more interactions between like-minded 
individuals than non-like-minded individuals, and techniques have been devel-
oped to measure this property. Put in these terms then, Mill-style arguments 
suggest that homophily somehow prevents opinion diversity; reversing ho-
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mophily is a sufficient strategy for improving opinion diversity. The assess-
ment of whether Mill is correct will turn out to be “it depends” and we will be 
in a better position to say on what. 
2.2  Psychological and Sociological Background 
The processes of opinion change and spread can be divided into the psycholog-
ical and the sociological. The Millian suggestion is directed towards sociologi-
cal changes – it does not, for example, promote a change in how opinions or 
beliefs should be updated. With respect to the latter, philosophers are fond of 
the Bayesian framework, an appropriate idealization given the aim of studying 
what ideally rational agents would do. Moreover, such an aim gives some li-
cense to freeing oneself from the constraints of human psychology. However, 
since the Millian strategy is geared towards making certain types of interac-
tions more frequent, i.e., between individuals with differing opinions, and not 
how someone should update their opinions given an interaction, it is more 
appropriate to select idealizations about opinion updating that are motivated by 
what is empirically known about human cognition.  
To this end, the relevant literature includes work done on a family of related 
biases, including biased assimilation,5 myside bias, and confirmation bias.6 A 
common thread of all of these biases is that an individual’s current opinion or 
belief can skew how new information is integrated. For example, information 
that is consistent with one’s opinions is more likely to be adopted, while infor-
mation that is at odds with one’s opinion is discounted, or even ignored. For the 
points that will be important later, the differences between these biases will not 
matter so much as the family of them.  
The sociological processes are about how interactions are “selected.” Inter-
actions throughout a population are structured by factors related to the medi-
ums by which opinions are made accessible. For example, how opinions spread 
through a society that trades information strictly through face-to-face interac-
tions is going to be different than a society that has access to the internet. For 
one, the internet removes physical limitations that may otherwise prevent indi-
viduals from interacting, which suggests at first that the number of interactions 
or connections between individuals in the population increases. That is, the 
introduction of the internet generates the expectation that the number of en-
claves or echo chambers would drop as a result of removing physical limita-
tions of communication. However, contrary to this expectation, a society with 
access to the internet is not simply an increase in scale of connections of com-
munication. While the advent of the internet has increased accessibility to 
                                                             
5  In particular, see Lord, Ross and Lepper (1979); Miller et al. (1993); Munro et al. (2002); 
Taber and Lodge (2006). 
6  Jonas et al. (2001); Wason (1960, 1968). 
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information generally, information is not well-mixed. The internet has signifi-
cant factions and enclaves where individuals get their information from, which 
can form, e.g., echo chambers. Opinions, and information generally, are not 
evenly distributed among real populations and are not equally accessible to any 
individual.7 
We can be more precise about the accessibility of information and opinions 
and how they are distributed. An important advancement in the social sciences 
and relevant humanities is the recognition of network structures and their ef-
fects on how something like information spreads or diffuses in a population. 
The next section provides a brief introduction to network theory. 
2.3  Some Technical Background on Network 
A network consists of nodes (or vertices) and links (or edges). Nodes might 
represent a Facebook or Twitter account, while links could represent friend- 
ships or followers. The structure of a network refers to the distribution of links 
among nodes. Numerous distributions of links are possible given a set of nodes, 
but several statistical patterns tend to emerge for different networks.  
There are four common types of networks: random, regular, small-world, 
and scale-free. In a random network, some number of links are randomly (uni-
formly) distributed between nodes. With a sufficient number of links, such 
networks are good approximations for well-mixed systems – imagine for ex-
ample a schoolyard full of children playing tag. By contrast, in a regular net-
work every node has the same number of links. A simple example would be a 
ring of nodes where each node is a member of two links, one to its left and one 
to its right. Call the nodes connected by links ‘neighbors.’ A ring can be ex-
tended into another regular graph by having nodes form links with their neigh-
bors’ neighbors. Another example is wrapping the edges of a chessboard such 
that columns A and H are connected and rows 1 and 8 are connected (if you’re 
imagining this in three dimensions, it would form a very thick donut shape). A 
small-world graph is one where most nodes do not have links between them, 
but only a small number of traverses over links are required to form a path 
from one node to another. A simple example would be taking a ring of nodes 
and adding some links between nodes that are “across the pond.” Finally, a 
scale-free network is one where the distribution of links follows a power law, 
that is, the frequency of nodes that have very few links will be high while the 
frequency of nodes with many links will be low. Many social networks are 
scale-free: a few celebrities have lots of Twitter followers, while most people 
have relatively few.  
                                                             
7  For an accessible introduction to this area that draws from numerous fields, see Hendricks 
and Hansen (2016). 
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The networks just described tend to be static, that is, the links between 
nodes don’t change over time. They are thus good approximations for systems 
where connections between individuals change much more slowly than the 
diffusion processes that happen on them. In some cases, however, the connec-
tions between individuals change frequently enough, and even change in re-
sponse to what’s happening in the system. In these scenarios it is important to 
model changes in links. For example, people may change who they come in 
contact with during the course of an epidemic, and then return to their usual 
interactions once the epidemic dies down. Models of such phenomena are 
improved by using adaptive networks instead of static ones, which has spawned 
a growing area of study. However, the details here would take us too far from 
more relevant considerations.  
2.4  Homophily 
An important pattern found in many networks is homophily. Homophily is the 
tendency for there to be more links between like-minded nodes and fewer links 
between non-like-minded nodes. Many social networks exhibit homophily.8 In 
fact, it has been argued that homophily results in polarization, such as increas-
ing partisan voting patterns, the adoption of more extreme policies, the rise of 
overtly partisan television networks, or more generally the divergence of politi-
cal attitudes.9 Such arguments, while based on empirical studies, wave their 
hands towards the underlying explanation. They do not attempt to understand 
the underlying causes or mechanisms of how homophily could produce polari-
zation. As we will see shortly, it is possible to have populations with homophi-
ly that fail to be polarized. Additional assumptions need to be made in order to 
infer that homophily is a cause of or factor in producing polarization. Making 
explicit these sorts of assumptions is where the field of opinion dynamics plays 
an important role in the assessment of Mill-style arguments. For example, 
interactions between individuals with differing opinions can be approximated 
with models where individuals mix randomly (i.e., where homophily is low). 
But as we’ll also see, the mixing assumptions by themselves are not sufficient 
to avoid polarization, thus reducing the scope of validity of Millian-style argu-
ments. 
                                                             
8  See McPherson, Smith-Lovin and Cook (2001); Smith, McPherson and Smith-Lovin (2014); 
Halberstam and Knight (2016). 
9  See Gilbert, Bergstrom and Karahalios (2009); Baron et al. (1996); Sunstein (2002). 
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3.  Generative Opinion Dynamics 
In general, an important aim of the field of opinion dynamics is to formally 
represent how opinions form and spread through real populations. The field of 
opinion dynamics is growing steadily, but not uniformly in a given discipline. 
The most technical and formal investigations tend to happen in areas such as 
physics, where the focus often lies on representing population-level patterns 
and finding conserved quantities.10 We could call this sub-field phenomenal 
opinion dynamics. Other areas focus more on how certain population-level 
phenomena, such as polarization, consensus, or opinion diversity, emerge or 
are generated from micro- or individual-level processes. Ideally, these process-
es are empirically motivated from research in fields such as social psychology. 
This subfield could be called mechanistic or generative opinion dynamics.11 I 
do not believe there is a bright line that distinguishes generative and phenome-
nal opinion dynamics, it is rather a distinction that helps highlight the agent-
based approaches against a much longer tradition of equation-based modeling, 
a point I return to later in Section 5.  
One feature of generative opinion dynamics is the explicit and separate rep-
resentation of the psychological and social processes. Representing the psycho-
logical and social aspects separately makes it easier to understand their indi-
vidual contributions and their combined effects. This understanding makes it 
possible to better assess arguments about the causes of phenomena such as 
polarization.  
For example, as mentioned above, homophily – increased interactions be-
tween like-minded individuals – has been cited as the cause for polarization, 
particularly with respect to partisan issues. Pointing at homophily as an expla-
nation for polarization, however, passes over background assumptions that may 
be crucial to the explanation. Models allow us to test how such a putative ex-
planation is sensitive to those assumptions. For example, for what range of 
opinion-updating processes will homophily produce polarization? Will polari-
                                                             
10  For an overview, see Castellano, Fortunato and Loreto (2009). 
11  I shall prefer the term ‘generative’ over ‘mechanistic.’ While ‘mechanistic’ has the right 
flavor in that it draws attention to the mechanisms and processes that constitute or cause a 
phenomenon, specifically to an emergent phenomenon, I want to avoid the reader from 
thinking that the relevant explanations are mechanistic explanations in the way that the 
New Mechanists have characterized them (see Bechtel 2008; Craver 2007; Craver and 
Darden 2013; Machamer, Darden and Craver 2000). It may be possible to extend the stand-
ard mechanistic conception of explanation to include some of the complexity that fails to 
be captured by the early mechanistic conception (see Roe and Baumgaertner 2016). Even if it 
could, the broader framework of generative explanations is better fitting. In brief, the idea is 
that if you didn’t grow the emergent or macroscopic phenomenon, then you didn’t explain 
it. Generative explanations are described in the work of Joshua Epstein (see e.g., Epstein 
2006). 
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zation occur if people update their opinions by taking some kind of average 
between theirs and their interlocutors’?  
Dandekar, Goel and Lee (2013) show that homophily is not sufficient to 
produce polarization. That is, homophily will not always produce polarization, 
it matters what the opinion formation process is, i.e., how agents integrate 
information. If the opinion formation process is similar to a DeGroot-like aver-
aging process (where opinions are updated by taking a weighted average of 
their opinion and that of their neighbors), then Dandekar, Goel and Lee demon-
strate that polarization is never produced.12 In order to produce polarization, 
homophily needs to be combined with something like biased assimilation, 
where individuals discount dissenting opinions and weight more heavily opin-
ions consistent with their own.13 
A similar lesson can be found in Baumgaertner, Tyson and Krone (2016). 
They study a relatively weak form of bias they call amplification – opinions 
can become more entrenched when shared between like-minded individuals.14 
They introduce an attitude spectrum, {-L, ...,-2, -1,1,2,...,L}, where the sign of 
the attitude represents a yes/no opinion and the magnitude of the attitude repre-
sents how entrenched that opinion is. By default, agents update their opinion by 
increasing or decreasing their attitude towards their interlocutor, which over 
several iterations would make agents “meet in the middle.”15 But, with some 
small frequency, agents will “amplify” their opinions when interacting with an 
agent with the same opinion (how frequently this occurs can be varied in the 
model). When the opinion formation process without amplification is imple-
mented on a regular network (e.g. a grid), opinions will tend to form clusters 
that become larger over time. The distribution of attitudes, however, moves 
towards centered opinions. That is, extreme opinions disappear over time until 
only the -1 and 1 attitudes remain (and then eventually, after a very long time, a 
single attitude will remain, though which one will be subject to chance). The 
clustering of opinions is something that emerges in their model and is a repre-
sentation of homophily. Such clustering, however, is not enough to produce 
                                                             
12  “DeGroot-like” refers to the work of DeGroot (1974). 
13  To be clear, the claim is not that it is impossible to produce polarization by having agents 
completely cut off links to dissenters and only create links to like-minded people; that is in 
principle possible. Rather, the claim is that empirically-informed levels of homophily will 
still contain a sufficient number of links between non-like-minded individuals such that 
polarization is not achieved if individuals update their opinions by some DeGroot-like aver-
aging process.  
14  Amplification is a stylized version of a bias related to a family of biases where one’s initial 
opinion or belief biases subsequent opinion updates. Examples include biased assimilation, 
the myside bias, or confirmation bias. Studies on biased assimilation include Lord, Ross and 
Lepper (1979); Miller et al. (1993); Munro et al. (2002); Taber and Lodge (2006). For empiri-
cal studies on confirmation bias see Jonas et al. (2001); Wason (1960, 1968). 
15  This strategy closely resembles the conciliationist position in the peer disagreement literature. 
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polarization. In their case, generating polarization occurs with (in combination 
with the emergence of clustering) the addition of a very small amount of ampli-
fication.  
Given the results of Baumgaertner, Tyson and Krone, and Dandekar, Goel 
and Lee, the temptation may be to point towards something like amplification 
or biased assimilation as the root or dominant cause of polarization. Some 
opinion models have explored this possibility. Bounded confidence models are 
one example that show how psychological features alone could produce polari-
zation.16 These models are “well-mixed” systems in that interactions are un-
structured – agents interact with each other randomly. That does not mean, 
however, that all agents can influence each other. The notable feature of 
bounded confidence models is that agents that become sufficiently dissimilar 
with respect to their opinions cease to affect one another. In bounded confi-
dence models, agents have continuous opinions (from -1 to 1) and whether one 
agent changes her opinion in response to another’s depends on whether the 
distance between their opinions is below some threshold. This threshold is 
interpreted as something like uncertainty or bounded confidence around the 
opinion. If the uncertainty of one opinion overlaps with the uncertainty of 
another, then the agents update their opinions, otherwise no updating occurs.  
In variations of the bounded confidence model, sometimes referred to as rel-
ative agreement models, an agent changes her opinion linearly in response to 
another with the amount of overlap between the opinion segments (the amount 
of their agreement) as well as their confidence. For example, the opinion of an 
agent with high confidence (i.e., low uncertainty) will occupy a narrow seg-
ment of the opinion spectrum, while an opinion of an agent with low confi-
dence (high uncertainty) will occupy a larger segment of the opinion spectrum. 
Thus, two confident agents are less likely to have their opinion segments over-
lap while agents with high uncertainty are more likely to overlap in their opin-
ion segments. Moreover, the uncertainties of opinions decrease as agents inter-
act with others whom they agree with. In a sense, agents can become more 
“close-minded” over time because they do not “listen” to opinions that are 
sufficiently different.  
One of the interesting results of bounded confidence models is that a popu-
lation of agents with initially identical uncertainties but randomly distributed 
opinions can nevertheless converge towards a fragmented distribution of opin-
ion – they fail to converge on one opinion. For example, if the initial uncertain-
ties are not too high, then a population of agents with opinions randomly dis-
tributed between -1 and 1 can converge towards two clusters, one cluster 
around -0.5 and the other around 0.5. Deffuant et al. (2002) show how popula-
tions with extreme opinions – opinions that are held with sufficiently high 
                                                             
16  Notable papers include Hegselmann and Krause (2002); Deffuant et al. (2002); Dandekar, 
Goel and Lee (2013); Salzarulo (2006); Deffuant et al. (2000); Weisbuch et al. (2003).  
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confidence towards the polar ends of the spectrum (- 1 and 1) – can produce 
something like polarization. That is, agents that are more moderate in their 
opinion (around 0) and have sufficiently high uncertainty, will eventually be 
drawn towards one of the polar ends of the spectrum. While these results hold 
for well-mixed populations, it is expected that the results also hold (if not exac-
erbated) if the population were on a network, i.e., if the interactions were struc-
tured.  
The results discussed so far may tempt us to think that polarization is the 
product of some set of psychological features of opinion updating, that we can 
(at least for the most part) ignore the social aspects of opinion dynamics. It is 
not always the case, however, that when psychological features produce popu-
lation-level phenomena in the case of well-mixed populations, that the same 
results hold for structured interactions. For example, in their follow-up work, 
Baumgaertner, Tyson and Krone (2017) demonstrate that if populations are 
sufficiently mixed, then amplification actually decreases the time it takes to 
reach consensus – polarization is avoided entirely. By “mixing” they have in 
mind that agents have both interactions with local neighbors, but also some 
interactions with random agents in the population (this is in effect a small-
world network). Thus the same psychological processes produce wildly differ-
ent results depending on the structure of interactions.  
So, what is the lesson we are to take so far? Opinion dynamics models help 
us recognize that certain population-level phenomena like polarization emerge 
only with the right combination of population structure and psychological 
features of opinion updating. Homophily by itself doesn’t produce polarization, 
you need to add biased assimilation or amplification. But biased assimilation or 
amplification by themselves won’t necessarily produce polarization either. 
Interactions have to be sufficiently structured in a certain homophilic way in 
order for a family of biases to produce polarization. Then again, some opinion 
formation processes, like those described by bounded confidence models, will 
produce polarization for both well-mixed and structured populations. But these 
assume that individuals become increasingly “closed-minded” over time. The 
point is that it matters what we are assuming with respect to social and psycho-
logical aspects of beliefs when we are imagining how they spread and whether 
the end result will be consensus, polarization, or diversity. What all this means 
for Mill-style arguments about diversity is treated in the next section.  
4. Lessons from Opinion Dynamics Models  
The previous section contrasted sociological aspects of opinion formation 
against psychological ones and provided some examples where different com-
binations of these features affect phenomena such as polarization and consen-
sus differently. We are nearly in a position to say how these considerations bear 
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on the study of opinion diversity and its importance to Mill-style arguments. 
But before we do, we need some additional clarity on what is meant by ‘diver-
sity’ in this context.  
4.1  Distribution vs. Process View of Diversity 
Is diversity some distribution of opinions or some structured relationship be-
tween them? Or is it better to think of diversity in terms of processes? Consider 
the case of polarization. On the one hand, polarization can refer to a distribu-
tion of opinions with higher frequencies on the ends of a spectrum and low 
frequencies in the center. Call this the distribution view. On the other hand, 
polarization can refer to the processes that would, under suitable conditions, 
produce clusters of opinions on the far ends of an opinion spectrum. Call this 
the process view. There is no standard interpretation of polarization in terms of 
either the distribution view or the process view. The same difference can be 
applied to diversity. I will argue that we should think of diversity in terms of 
processes and not distributions.  
The point of arguing for either a distribution or process view matters to our 
understanding of Mill-style arguments for opinion diversity. If we adopt the 
distribution view of diversity, we find ourselves in a (near) paradoxical posi-
tion, while the process view avoids this. Consider what it means to produce or 
maintain opinion diversity on the distribution view. On the one hand, we want 
diversity of opinion in order to maximize our chances of finding the truth (or 
whatever the relevant measure m is, as discussed in Section 2.1 – for simplici-
ty’s sake I will use truth as the illustrative case). On the other hand, we expect 
that epistemic peers would reach consensus, and thus see a decrease in diversi-
ty. On the distribution view then, diversity of opinion is not the thing we should 
be aiming for because it would encourage false beliefs. If we are after the truth, 
we want populations to be receptive and adaptive to information. Having a 
diverse set of opinions initially is a good way to start, but the maintenance of 
diversity can come at the cost of our ultimate aim: consensus on the truth.  
The process view of diversity avoids this issue. It matters less what the dis-
tribution of opinions looks like than what the distribution would look like under 
suitable conditions. If it is not obvious what the truth is, or if we are in a do-
main where truth is not the relevant notion, as may be the case when it comes 
to matters of mere taste, then diversity of opinion is expected to create a distri-
bution of opinions that is relatively uniform on an opinion spectrum. If, howev-
er, the truth is as bright as the light of day, then we expect opinion diversity to 
be overshadowed by the truth. The interesting point of consideration lies be-
tween these two scenarios, where there are truths about a domain, but they 
require work to uncover; where truths require some kind of searching. In some 
cases we may get lucky by starting somewhere where it is easy to stumble in 
the right area. The supposed benefit of opinion diversity is that it needn’t de-
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pend on such luck. Even if we happen to start our search in a place that’s away 
from the truth, by moving around in various directions some members of the 
population may find the truth before others, but ultimately others will find their 
way to the same place (e.g., through some form of communication).  
A second argument for the process view addresses the accessibility of opin-
ions and information. It is possible for a social network with homophily to have 
a global distribution of opinions that is diverse. Partition an opinion spectrum 
however you like, but make sure that each segment is represented by agents in 
the population. Then, set up a network so that links between agents exist when 
they have the same opinion.17 In such a scenario the population has a diversity 
of opinions, but with little to no contact between those differences of opinion. 
On the process view, such a scenario would not count as diverse (but would on 
a distribution view). If agents with differences of opinion do not communicate 
with one another, then it is significantly less likely that any of them will change 
their mind since they do not come in contact with dissenting opinions.  
This is one way to understand the point of one of Mill’s argument. His ar-
gument describes the importance of seeking out dissenting opinions. We can 
understand this as an attempt to break down homophily and create links be-
tween individuals that are not like-minded. If opinions are distributed in such a 
way that homophily is decreased, then we may expect to see more opinions to 
change in what would be presumably a beneficial way. But before we consider 
the caveats of this idea in more detail, a brief concession should be made for 
the distribution view.  
Although I have argued against the distribution view of opinion diversity, it 
does have a limited explanatory role. For example, Duggins (2017) argues that 
one of the shortcomings of the fields of opinion dynamics thus far is its failure 
to recognize diversity as a population-level phenomenon in its own right. Most 
of the literature has focused on polarization or consensus, but there are many 
scenarios where we see a diversity of opinions. If polarization and consensus 
merit explanations, then so too does diversity. In order to account for this phe-
nomenon, Duggins (2017) introduces the ISC (influence, susceptibility, and 
conformity) model. In the ISC model, diversity of opinions can be maintained 
because individuals end up being pulled towards the center and the extremes 
simultaneously in a population that balances heterogeneous intolerance, sus-
ceptibility, and conformity.18 So one role of thinking of opinion diversity in 
terms of distributions is to help identify relevant phenomena and then build 
                                                             
17  To make sure that the network is connected, one can add links required between agents 
that are different, but only so many as to make the network connected, no more. 
18  The details of these concepts are not relevant for the point being made here. Readers inter-
ested in better understanding how these notions are formalized in the ISC models are re-
ferred to the original article.  
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models of it. This role, however, is transient. As Duggins goes on to argue 
using his ISC model, the phenomenon of diversity can be produced by individ-
uals being simultaneously pulled in multiple directions. This is an appeal to 
processes. Duggins does not consider how these processes might change if 
some opinions were the true ones. However, if truth were incorporated in his 
model somehow, presumably we expect that diversity of opinions will be tem-
porary and that at least in the limit the population can converge on the truth.  
4.2  On Millian Arguments for Diversity  
Let us finally turn to some insights we glean from our considerations of opin-
ion dynamics models as they apply to Mill-style arguments for opinion diversi-
ty. To briefly recap, the central idea of Mill is that increased interactions be-
tween people of different opinions is a sufficient strategy for increasing some 
metric by which a population improves as a result of the relevant opinion 
spreading (e.g., more true beliefs). What our consideration of opinion models 
provide are numerous caveats for, and refinements of, this idea, particularly in 
those scenarios where it is not obvious what, e.g., the truth is, and the spread of 
opinions is largely governed by, e.g., social influence.  
Let us suppose that we have a population that already has a diverse range of 
opinions. Under what conditions can that diversity (or something close to it) be 
maintained as agents update their opinions, particularly when a small bias 
exists in which agents tend to amplify their opinions? Baumgaertner, Tyson 
and Krone (2016) provide one answer: in the fully spatial case (where the net-
work is regular), diversity of opinion or attitudes can be maintained by counter-
balancing amplification with co-influence (or “centrist”) functions. Centrist 
influence functions in their model are a way to bias interactions with agents 
that hold moderate or center opinions. Thus, while amplification and clustering 
tend to cause agents to become more extreme in their opinions and thereby 
cause polarization (not diversity), centrist influence functions pull agents to-
wards the center of the spectrum. In this sense their model is similar to the 
model developed by Duggins: diversity of opinion is maintained when agents 
are pulled in two directions. The important point to notice here is that it is not 
simply having any non-like-minded individuals interact that ensures diversity, 
but specifically increased interactions between more extreme opinions and 
moderate opinions. This idea is consistent with the mental model behind Milli-
an-style arguments, but provides refinement of those ideas.  
What if, instead, a population is initially polarized? What processes lead to 
the undoing of polarization and towards a more diverse distribution of opinion? 
An artificial way of doing this would be to “inject” new opinions into the popu-
lation through the birth of new individuals. New opinions, however, need not 
come to be in this way. If we imagine that the population remains the same 
through time, what needs to be avoided is the possibility that sufficiently many 
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agents can become too close-minded. That is, it should not be the case that 
sufficiently many agents reach a point where they no longer change their mind. 
As we saw in the case of Deffuant et al. (2002), close-mindedness, i.e. extreme-
ly high confidence in an opinion, prevents individuals from updating their 
opinion unless the other opinion is sufficiently similar, thereby causing and 
maintaining a polarized population. In this situation, even if the agents interact 
with non-like-minded individuals, polarization is not reversed. That’s because 
homophily is not the sufficient reason for the polarization, but rather the confi-
dence levels that individuals have achieved after numerous opinion updates that 
prevent them from “listening” to others. So in this case, the Millian idea to 
increase interactions between people of different opinions will not increase 
diversity. We thus have an example where Mill’s argument is not valid under 
one set of plausible psychological assumptions.  
In other models (e.g., Baumgaertner, Tyson and Krone 2017) increasing the 
overall mixing of individuals increases the number of interactions between 
non-like-minded individuals and can be a means of breaking down polariza-
tion; without a sufficient amount of mixing, interactions are structured (i.e., 
individuals interact with the same set of neighbors) and over time this generates 
homophily and polarization. However, if the amount of mixing is sufficiently 
high, another effect takes hold: consensus on a random opinion! If we are 
thinking in terms of the process view of opinion diversity, then consensus too is 
at odds with the Millian suggestion. The moral that Baumgaertner, Tyson and 
Krone (2017) draw is that there is a “Goldilocks” level of mixing: too little and 
the population polarizes, too much and the population reaches consensus, but 
just the right amount of interactions between non-like-minded individuals 
generates and maintains diversity. So there can be too much of good thing – it 
is not always beneficial to keep increasing interactions between non-like-
minded individuals. Here again we see a narrowing of the scope of validity of 
Mill’s argument. Mill’s suggestion is correct that, in a scenario where mixing is 
very low to non-existent, increased interactions help achieve opinion diversity. 
But in scenarios where there already is some mixing, the suggestion breaks 
down.19 
As a final point in this section, allow me to turn the table and demonstrate 
how philosophical considerations can feed back on opinion dynamics model-
ing. An opinion dynamics model that exhibits opinion diversity would take 
clustered populations of opinions and increase their range, but would also make 
sure that, upon discovering better ideas or the truth, make the variation de-
crease again – this is an insight we gain from thinking of diversity as a process 
                                                             
19  While it can be said more precisely what these levels of mixing are in the model, it is diffi-
cult to assess how these levels correspond to real populations. This is one of the challenges 
of validating opinion dynamics models and requires sufficiently robust data that is difficult 
to obtain. 
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not as a distribution. A helpful analogy is ant foraging. When no food has yet 
been found, ants move around randomly searching for food. When some ants 
find food, they head towards their nest, leaving behind a pheromone trail. Other 
ants that encounter the pheromone trail follow it, heading in the opposite direc-
tion of the nest and thereby increasing their chances of finding the food source. 
Once they find the food source, they too return to the nest and reinforce the 
pheromone trail. Eventually a large fraction of the ant colony can be found 
walking along the trail, either towards the food, or towards the nest, creating an 
ant highway. When the food source runs out, however, the ants stop heading 
back to the nest. The failure of reinforcing the pheromone trail means that the 
trail eventually dissipates and the ants go back to a random search.  
Obviously, humans are not merely ants in the way they form their opinions 
and beliefs. The point of the analogy is that the population level patterns in the 
ant foraging case have some important similarities to how we expect a popula-
tion of humans will react to truth or improved ideas: as the strength or salience 
of the truth increases, for example, we expect a larger fraction of the population 
to be drawn towards it, but if that trail is or becomes non-existent, the popula-
tion ought to return to a wider or more diverse search area (as per the Millian 
suggestion). To my knowledge, no such opinion dynamics models currently 
exist and this is an opportunity for new areas of investigation.  
Towards a concrete suggestion for the opinion dynamics literature, recall 
some of the model features outlined in the discussion on Mill, specifically that 
r (“the clearer perception and livelier impression of truth”) is like a resource 
that changes opinions in such a way that m is increased (some metric by which 
populations can improve). When r is absent, the processes underlying the opin-
ion dynamics should cultivate opinion diversity. That way, when r is present, 
the processes increase the chance and rate that m increases because the opin-
ions of the individuals change accordingly. If r is “strong” enough – think of 
abundance as being akin to how obvious the value or truth of an idea is – then 
we expect the opinion processes to play a weaker role in driving how opinions 
change. The opinion dynamics literature explores the case where r is absent. 
Extending these models to include r, m, and the requisite assumptions is a 
natural direction for the field to take. 
5.  Agent-Based and Equation-Based Modeling 
One of the main points of this paper has been to examine some assumptions 
that are left implicit when it comes to arguing for the importance of opinion 
diversity. Generative opinion dynamics models, often in the form of agent-
based models, provide a suitable framework for investigating these assump-
tions. It may be tempting to think that generative opinion dynamics models, 
and perhaps agent-based models more generally, provide a better understanding 
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of phenomena such as polarization because they increase realism. In the final 
section of this paper I will argue that this is not the proper way to understand 
the contributions that opinion dynamics models provide. Increasing the number 
of assumptions does not imply an increase in realism, although a model with 
more assumptions does imply that the model is more specific (or less abstract). 
A brief discussion of the nature of models helps make this point clear.  
Models are sometimes seen as surrogates for a target system. From this per-
spective, manipulating the model is like manipulating the target system, but 
without actually affecting the target system. One reason we may not want to 
manipulate the target system is concerned with ethics. Biomedical researchers, 
for example, use mice as models for humans in preclinical trials in order to 
gather information about the toxicity and efficacy of a new drug – using hu-
mans to measure toxicity is not generally considered ethical. Another reason 
may be that manipulating the target system is not feasible, for physical or polit-
ical reasons. We cannot, for example, remove so much carbon from the atmos-
phere in a year to bring the total ppm back to 350 to observe the effects on 
climate. For that, we use models of the climate.  
Agent-based modeling can invite the use of a similar perspective where 
models are target-system surrogates. This temptation seems to come about 
when agent-based modeling is contrasted with equation-based modeling. An 
equation-based model tends to represent features of a target system in terms of 
aggregates. For example, the Lotka-Volterra equations represent the dynamics 
of two species that interact, where one species is the predator and the other the 
prey:  
݀ݔ
݀ݐ = 	βx	– 	κxy ݀ݕ
݀ݐ = εxy − δy	 
The variables x and y represent the number of prey and predators, respectively. 
The β parameter represents the birth or growth rate of the prey (absent preda-
tors) and κ represents the rate at which the prey are killed, which is assumed to 
be proportional to the rate at which predators and prey meet (xy). The ε pa-
rameter represents the rate at which the predator population grows from eating 
the prey and δ represents the natural death rate of the predator population. 
Notice that all of these terms are representing population-level features of the 
target system, no individuals are explicitly represented.  
An agent-based version of a predator-prey system consists of representations 
at the individual level. For example, one set of representations, the agents, 
correspond to the individuals in the target system, the predators and prey. 
These agents then “interact” by, for example, moving randomly through a two-
dimensional space until the coordinates of two agents are sufficiently close 
(which is determined by some parameter). If the two agents are a predator-prey 
pair, then there is some probability that the prey agent is “consumed,” i.e., the 
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prey agent is removed or deleted, and the “energy” level of the predator is 
increased. When the energy level of a predator is sufficiently high, it “repro-
duces,” i.e., a new predator agent is brought into existence; when the energy 
level is sufficiently low, a predator “dies,” i.e., is removed or deleted. Finally, a 
prey agent “reproduces” periodically, bringing a new prey agent into existence.  
Several points of comparison between the equation-based and agent-based 
models are worth highlighting. While the agent-based model has been de-
scribed in a simple way, anyone who wishes to implement it computationally is 
faced with numerous choices that must be made. Once made, tests can be done 
to check whether and how they affect the model (these tests can fall under both 
sensitivity and robustness analyses). For example, when new predators are 
brought into existence, what coordinates should they be given? Should they be 
near the “parent”? Or should new predators be placed randomly? Does this 
choice make a difference? And with respect to what does it or does it not make 
a difference? It is unlikely that choosing where to place new predators makes a 
difference to certain patterns in the dynamics of the two populations, but that 
would be the case against the backdrop of agents moving around the space 
randomly. Choices about placement of new predators could very well make a 
difference if agents aggregated in some way. Similar considerations apply to 
the introduction of new prey. Of course, some of these details can be avoided 
by not situating the agents in space at all. Instead, one might have the two 
populations interact by randomly selecting pairs of individuals. Even still, 
however, assumptions are being made about the distributions of frequencies of 
interactions between agents. The point, in short, is that there are many details 
that have been left out in the short description of the agent-based version that 
would need to be specified when implementing it.  
From the perspective that models are surrogates for target systems, the con-
trast from equation-based to agent-based models invites the idea that agent-
based models are more realistic versions of the target system. This is because 
agent-based models require more decisions to be made about what details or 
“parts” to include, where these “parts” can “latch onto the world.” It is true that 
agent-based models make it more difficult to hand-wave over details because 
the algorithms have to be sufficiently specified in order to implement and run 
simulations. It would be a mistake, however, to think that this required level of 
detail implies there are specific things in the world that the “parts” in the model 
are supposed to latch on to. Take, for example, population structure. In the 
equation-based model, the assumption is that there is no population structure, 
the individuals are being “well-mixed.” However, there is a sense in which 
there is an underlying structure, it’s just that it is random or stochastic. In an 
agent-based model, a random network structure (as described above in Section 
2) would provide a decent approximation of the well-mixing assumption in the 
equation-based model. The agent-based model then lets us investigate whether 
the well-mixing assumption matters to the phenomenon in question. That is, 
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does the model still behave the same way if we assumed instead that individu-
als interacted in some other structured way? As we saw in the discussion of 
homophily and amplification, the answer is sometimes “yes.” These structures, 
however, need not bear on reality directly. In many cases they are additional 
idealizations made to investigate other assumptions or model behaviors. And 
while network structures have analogs in the world, as discussed in Section 2, 
we should not be so quick to think that these structures can serve as surrogates 
for real populations.  
Instead, I suggest that we should think of these additional assumptions as 
characterizing the modeling choices we can expect we would need to make if 
we were to try to create realistic models, models that could be said to be predic-
tive of the target system. Agent-based models can demonstrate the pertinence 
of several assumptions that are (implicitly) assumed not to make a significant 
difference in the model behavior. In developing a predictive model, those dif-
ferences can turn out to matter, and it is worth knowing which choices we have 
to make and which choices we don’t have to make (weighted by other consid-
erations, such as the level of risk if we get the predictions wrong). In short, 
when models become more realistic they tend to bring more assumptions to the 
forefront, but models can bring more assumptions to the forefront without 
being more realistic. That, I suggest, is the role that current opinion dynamics 
models have in investigating Mill-style arguments.  
6.  Conclusion 
Models can improve our understanding of how different assumptions about 
psychology and social structure interact to produce patterns of opinion dynam-
ics. The interest here has been to apply the results of the opinion dynamics 
literature to the Millian suggestion that increasing interactions between non-
like-minded individuals is a way to increase opinion diversity, which in turn 
improves society at large. Specifically, the goal has been to understand how the 
scope of the validity of Millian-style arguments depends on plausible assump-
tions that can be formalized using agent-based models. The most salient insight 
to be gained is that homophily (increased interactions between like-minded 
individuals) does not sufficiently explain decreased opinion diversity. Hence, 
decreasing homophily by increasing interactions between non-like-minded 
individuals does not assure opinion diversity. What we need in order to assess 
the validity of Millian-style arguments, and more importantly, to obtain the 
improvements we ultimately strive for, is to understand how opinion dynamics 
depend on a combination of psychological and sociological processes. We 
cannot look towards sociological changes alone if they do not join with psycho-
logical processes that produce opinion diversity. Understanding which combi-
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nations work and which don’t is where the opinion dynamics literature pro-
vides guidance.  
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